There is evidence that East Asians are biased to process information in a holistic, contextual fashion, whereas Western Europeans process information in an analytic, feature-based style. We argue that these cultural differences in informationprocessing styles are so pervasive that they affect cognitive function at the most basic levels, including the mechanics of cognition. However, as individuals age, it is not always the case that culture effects on cognitive processes magnify, despite many additional years of exposure to the culture. Neurobiological decline in cognitive function that occurs with age is a cognitive universal and can limit the strategies used in late adulthood, resulting in more similarity in cognitive function in late adulthood across cultures than is observed in young adulthood We present a theoretical framework for understanding the impact of aging on cognitive function cross-culturally. The importance of developing culture-invariant measures of processing resources is emphasized and methodological issues associated with the cross-cultural study of aging are addressed
AS the world economy becomes global in scope, it is increas-1 \ . ingly important to develop a theoretical and empirical understanding of cultural differences in cognitive processes that may exist between Asian and Western cultures. Understanding these differences has tremendous implications for the development of successful international efforts and policies, as well as for accurate interpretation of information and events across cultures. Although a literature is beginning to emerge on differences that occur in cognitive processes between East Asian and Western cultures (Bond, 1991; Chan, 1996) , surprisingly little attention has been paid to this important issue. As Bond notes, "The data base here is meager in comparison to that available in other areas of psychology. Perceptual and cognitive psychologists generally assume that all people function the same way" (p. 20) . In this article, we will present a brief overview of what is known about differences in cognitive processes between East Asian and Western cultures, and then discuss how these differences are magnified or moderated by the aging process. Understanding the relationship of aging to cultural differences in cognition found in young adults will help clarify the aspects of cognitive aging that are invariant and universal as well as the role that acquired knowledge and experience play in mediating the effects of aging.
Although it might seem logical to assume that age would magnify any effects of culture on cognitive processes, due to the individual's increased exposure to the culture, we argue that the effects of culture will not always increase with age. We believe that there are some classes of cognitive behaviors in which age will act to minimize rather than magnify cultural differences. The purpose of this article is to develop a theoretical framework for the study of cognitive processes and aging in Eastern and Western cultures, as well as to provide some solutions to the complex sampling and stimulus presentation issues that must be addressed when conducting cross-cultural cognitive aging research.
Central to our thinking about aging, cognition, and culture are distinctions between what Geary and Lin (1996) have termed primary and secondary cognitive processes, and what Baltes (1993) calls the mechanics and pragmatics of cognition. Essentially, the terms primary cognition and cognitive mechanics refer to biologically based, hardwired cognitive functions. Geary and Lin describe primary cognitive processes as "cognitive competencies that emerge in children and unschooled populations and serve a plausible evolutionary function." Similarly, Baltes describes cognitive mechanics as the "hardware of the mind-evolution-based procedures, ways, and means of the 'adapted' mind." The Chinese would describe cognitive mechanics as tianzi, cognitive resources given to the individual from heaven (Chan, 1996) . In contrast to these evolutionary-based processes are culturally based cognitive processes. Baltes describes such culture-based processes as cognitive pragmatics-"culture-based software of the mind." The Chinese refer to pragmatics as zhunachangcognitive function resulting from training and education (Chan, 1996) . Both Geary and Lin and Baltes view the biologically based hardware of basic cognitive function to be more susceptible to the effects of aging whereas the culturally based "software of the mind" is less susceptible to aging due to the buffering effects of experience, learning, and culture. These views have implications for the impact of culture on cognitive function. They would predict that there should be few cultural differences in cognitive mechanics or primary cognition in either young or old adults. In contrast, one might expect substantial cultural differences in secondary, pragmatic cognitive processes and further expect that the differences would be magnified with age as the impact of culture increases (as Baltes hypothesizes).
Despite considerable theorizing on the issue, little is actually known about the interaction of aging and culture in cognitive function. Research to date in cognitive aging has focused al-
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most exclusively on samples reflecting Western cultures and values with little thought given to the possibility that processes assumed to be universals of cognitive aging may, in fact, be universals only for Westerners. In contrast to the arguments that effects of culture are focused on pragmatics of cognition (Baltes, 1993) and secondary cognitive processes (Geary & Lin, 1996) , we adopt the somewhat controversial position that culture may have an impact even at relatively basic levels of cognitive processes. We argue that processes that might initially be thought to be hard wired (what Baltes refers to as cognitive mechanics and Geary and Lin refer to as primary processes) are affected by culture. We also adopt the position that the effects of culture will not always increase with age, and that there are some types of cognitive mechanisms where age will act to minimize rather than to magnify cultural differences.
We will confine our discussion of culture and cognitive mechanisms to their relationship to memory for several reasons. First, there are well-documented declines in memory that occur with age that appear to be neurobiologically based (Baltes & Smith, 1997; Baltes & Lindenberger, 1997; Lindenberger & Baltes, 1994) and that would occur across cultures. Second, a great deal of progress has been made in understanding the mechanisms underlying age-related variance in many types of memory performance (Park et al., 1996; Salthouse, 1996) , so the present approach allows us to specify the particular mechanisms controlling observed cultural similarities and differences across the life span. Third, there is evidence that the fundamental information-processing strategies of young Asian adults will differ from those of young Western adults on memory tasks in interesting, culturally prescribed ways, with subsequent implications for aging.
COGNITION AND CULTURE
Before discussing the joint contributions of aging and culture to memory, we review a broad spectrum of data collected on young adults that supports the basic thesis that there are fundamental differences in information processing between East Asians and Westerners. Because Baltes (1993) and Geary and Lin (1996) argue that cognitive mechanics or primary cognitive function is defined by a lack of cultural differences, it is difficult to use this terminology to then develop culture-based hypotheses about these constructs. To avoid circularity, we focus our hypothesizing on the issue of process. Craik and Lockhart (1972) make a compelling case that process is fundamental to understanding memory and a wide range of other cognitive behaviors, a view that, although novel in 1972, is widely accepted 25 years later. By process, we mean mental operations performed on information in the environment or on information constructed or retrieved from the individual's cognitive system. We hypothesize that there are fundamental differences in the manner in which people perform many of these operations as a function of culture. There is little evidence on this topic, but what is known provides considerable support for our position. We believe that culture may bias people to process certain types of information at the expense of other information, and may also affect processes applied to the selected information. This differential selection and processing of information at basic levels has broad implications for many memory tasks.
It has long been asserted by ethnographers, philosophers, and historians of science that East Asians and people who are products of European culture attend to different aspects of the world and reason differently. East Asians are held to perceive and reason holistically, attending to the field in which objects are embedded and attributing causality to interactions between the object and the field. In contrast, Europeans are held to be analytic, attending primarily to the object and paying little attention to the field, preferring to attribute causality to properties of the object (e.g., Hsu, 1981; Liu, 1974; Lloyd, 1990; Nagashima, 1973; Nakamura, 1964; Needham, 1962) . We believe that the tendency of Asians to process information holistically results in a greater sensitivity and responsiveness to contextual cues in the memory environment. This should enhance memory when the cues are supportive but detract from memory when the cues are distracting. Nisbett (1998) and his colleagues (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 1999) have reviewed experimental evidence for the proposition that Asians process information more holistically and Americans more analytically. Asians have been shown in many studies to make causal attributions for the behavior of humans, animals, and even physical objects that are situationor context-oriented whereas Americans focus on presumed properties of the object. Asians have been shown to be capable of avoiding the "fundamental attribution error" of neglecting situational factors in causal accounts in studies where Americans have fallen prey to it. In support of this, Morris and colleagues (Morris & Peng, 1994; Morris, Nisbett, & Peng, 1995) reported Asians were more likely to attribute a murder to situational factors whereas Americans attributed it to the stable dispositions of the murderer. Other evidence for attention to situation factors comes from Ji, Peng, and Nisbett (1999) , who found that East Asians were more accurate than Americans at detecting covariation among two arbitrary stimulus events presented on a split computer screen. Chinese were not only more accurate than Americans in determining the rate of covariation of the two stimuli, but were also more confident in the accuracy of their judgments than Americans. Ji and colleagues also found that East Asians were more field dependent than Americans using the Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp (1974) classic Rod and Frame Task. Witkin and colleagues reported that field-dependent adults discriminate figure from ground less effectively than field-independent adults, an attribute consonant with the hypothesis that East Asians are more sensitive to context. Also in line with this hypothesis, Chan (1996) suggests that Chinese are more holistic and context dependent in their reading strategies. He reports that reading comprehension for Chinese adults occurs at the level of whole sentences whereas Westerners are more focused on word characteristics. Similarly, Abel and Hsu (1949) presented Rorschach cards to European American and Chinese American participants and found that the Chinese American participants were more likely than European Americans to give "whole card" responses; European Americans' answers were more likely to focus on features of the cards.
Even access to category information appears to differ with culture. Choi, Nisbett, and Smith (1997) reported that natural categories were used less readily by East Asians in making judgments, unless the categories were made highly salient. Similarly, Liu (1974) reports that when asked to place objects into categories, Asians had markedly different category structures than Americans, particularly with respect to categories associated with the natural environment, such as plants and ani-mals. Chiu (1972) reported that Chinese children were more likely to group pictures together in a relational-contextual manner ("mothers take care of babies and go together") whereas American children grouped according to common category memberships or shared features rather than relationships ("fruits go together" or "these all have a motor"). Norenzayan, Nisbett, and Smith (1999) found that Asians performed more poorly than Americans when required to use formal categorization rules to classify cartoon animals based on the animals' physical attributes. However, when classification was based on an implicit acquisition of the rule that did not require conscious processing, Asians and Americans performed similarly. In a similar vein, found that category membership played a greater role in judgments of similarity for Americans than for Asians. These data suggest that traditional memory supports in the form of category cues that are effective for both old and young Western adults (Park, Smith, Morrell, Puglisi, & Dudley, 1990 ) may be less effective for East Asians.
We should make it clear that we do not believe there is any evidence to suggest that cultural differences in cognitive processing, even at the most basic levels, are due to systematic genetic differences between Asians and Westerners. There is strong evidence that well-documented differences in cognitive processes between the groups are the results of fundamental differences between the cultural environments. For example, Stevenson and Stigler (1992) have shown that Asian superiority in mathematics, although dramatic, is demonstrably the result of superior education, harder work, and higher motivation. Geary, Salthouse, Chen, and Fan (1996) have shown that the superiority of Chinese in mathematics is a cohort phenomenon and is not found among older individuals, who trained at a time when mathematics education was less rigorous in Asia and mathematics was not seen so universally as a path to a better life for oneself and one's family.
There is also good evidence that the cognitive style differences in analytic versus holistic processing are cultural. In one developmental study of causal attribution, Asian and American children were highly similar in reasoning processes and departed progressively from one another over the course of development (Miller, 1984) , with Asian children focusing more on context with increasing age. In studies by Norenzayan and colleagues (1999) , highly assimilated Americans of Asian background were studied and found to be more similar to other Americans than to Asians. In a study conducted with bicultural Hong Kong citizens, Hong, Wong, and Lee (1996) showed that, when primed with Western symbols such as Mickey Mouse and cowboys, participants reasoned like Americans, and when primed with Chinese symbols such as dragons and temples, they reasoned like Chinese. We believe there is strong evidence that the differences described are truly a product of culture, thus making the study of its interaction with age (which is in a sense a proxy for experience with the culture) particularly interesting.
In summary, there is evidence that there are information-processing differences between cultures that exist at fundamental levels and that these differences will have a profound impact on memory. The evidence suggests that Asians, relative to their Western counterparts, are more likely to integrate target information with contextual information and excel at observing relationships that require integrative skills. In contrast, Westerners may excel at dealing with information-processing tasks that require componential analysis and the learning and use of categorical information. Before considering the implications of these processing biases for memory in both young and old adults, it seems important to present an overview of our thinking regarding the interrelationships among aging, culture, and cognition. We follow the overview with a specific discussion of East-West differences in basic cognitive mechanisms that drive memory and then discuss cultural differences in memory performance as a function of age. We close with a discussion of sampling and stimulus issues associated with the cross-cultural study of memory and aging. We should note that throughout the text the term Asian will be used as shorthand for East Asian, the only group for which much data exist and for whom our predictions are made. When we refer to Chinese subjects, we are also generalizing to East Asians. The justification for this is that a substantial amount of the evidence indicates that Koreans and Japanese differ from Americans in much the same ways as do Chinese.
COGNITION, AGING, AND CULTURE
We do believe, of course, that there are basic age-related changes that occur in cognitive function that are culturally invariant. We expect that, across cultures, older adults will generally evidence a decrease in cognitive processing resource and less efficient memory function. Declines in typical cognitive processing resource measures like speed of processing and working memory capacity are well documented in Western samples (Salthouse, 1991; Park et al., 1996) , and these mechanisms will be useful to characterize cognitive aging cross-culturally. We also expect that measures of the quantity of general knowledge that are age-invariant (or that actually favor elderly adults) in Western samples (Light, 1992; Howard, 1988) are age-invariant in other cultures as well (the pragmatics of cognition described by Baltes, 1993) . Nevertheless, although the quantity and quality of stored knowledge may not change as a function of culture across the life span, culture and age exert important and interesting effects in the way knowledge is used.
Central to our thinking is a distinction between culture-invariant and culture-saturated cognitive tasks. On culture-invariant tasks, young Chinese and Americans will perform similarly and age-related decline on the task will occur in both cultures at an equivalent rate. Some cognitive tasks, however, including some measures of cognitive resource, are culture-saturated. A culturesaturated task is one on which significant differences in performance occur as a function of culture despite the fact that the samples from the two cultures evidence equivalent cognitive resources on culture-invariant tasks. We hypothesize that, in general, Asians will perform in a manner superior to Americans on tasks where performance is facilitated by holistic, contextual processing and that Americans' performance will be superior to that of Asians on tasks where performance is facilitated by feature-based analytic processing. In particular, we argue that there are some tasks at levels that have been viewed traditionally as basic measures of resource, such as speed of processing and working memory, that are in fact culture-saturated. Thus, it is critically important to develop a culture-free measure of cognitive resource that can be used to understand cultural differences in memory function and the interaction of culture with age.
It is important to recognize that exposure to culture results in the activation of culture-specific processing biases and world knowledge that are automatically deployed and affect the P78 PARKETAL amount of resource required to perform a task. Thus, we suggest that there are cases where less cognitive resource is required for members of one culture to perform the same cognitive task compared with members of another culture. This is because the different cultures have processing biases, or culture-specific world knowledge, that cause the resource requirements of the task to differ across cultures. For example, consider a task that is highly reliant on the use of a taxonomic category structure (e.g., a free recall task where there are six words from each of five natural categories). The implicit taxonomic category structure would act as a stronger environmental support for Americans than for Chinese, who have more difficulty with these types of categories. We would expect that the recall of the same number of words would require more processing resources for Chinese compared with Americans, due to the limited availability of the categorical support for the Chinese. Moreover, we would expect that the environmental support provided by the category structure would moderate age-related decline on the task for American elderly adults relative to Chinese elderly adults. Thus, one might expect initial cultural differences between Asian and American young adults to magnify with age due to the smaller decline exhibited by American elderly adults compared with Chinese elderly adults. It is important to note here that we argue that culture differences magnify because these differences are based on automatically activated knowledge structures and not on effortful, strategic cognitive processes.
In contrast, we would expect cultural convergence of performance to occur in late adulthood on tasks that were culture-saturated for the young when the tasks relied on highly effortful, controlled processes. Cultural convergence with age occurs as a result of the leveling effects of neurobiologically based functional decline on basic processes, such as cognitive resource measures. Baltes and Smith (1997) and Baltes and Lindenberger (1997) present convincing evidence that neurobiological processes mediate substantial amounts of age-related decline across all domains of cognitive function, and it is reasonable to expect that these neurobiological processes are cultural universals. In support of this point, we recently collected data in Beijing and the United States to study cultural differences on a picture-fragment completion task. Young and old Chinese and American participants were presented with a fragmented picture of a common object (e.g., sun, boat, bird). The object was not readily identifiable and the task required participants to generate images of the missing features to name the item. Due to the featurebased focus of this task, young Americans performed much better than young Chinese (means of 7.88 and 3.83, respectively). In contrast, however, old Americans and old Asians performed the same (means of 2.76 and 3.06, respectively). All subjects from both cultures could name these prototypical pictures correctly when presented with an intact version and a vision screen was done on all subjects. We believe these findings suggest that on a resource-demanding task that is culturally saturated for young adults, old adults from the two cultures have fewer resources to deploy in a flexible manner. As a result of neurobiological leveling effects on cognition, older adults from both cultures approach the task similarly and perform more comparably than young adults from the two cultures.
We should note, as well, that cultural convergence with age could also occur due to cohort effects rather than to neurobiology. For example, if the two older cohorts shared more similar experiences than the two younger cohorts, an age convergence pattern could occur that was unrelated to culture per se. In fact, Geary and colleagues (1996) present such a pattern of findings with respect to arithmetic abilities. They reported that old Americans and Chinese performed more similarly on mathematical skills tests than young Americans and Chinese due to the intense focus on math education in China for the younger cohort.
Finally, we should also mention an alternative strategy that might be useful in teasing out culture effects, in addition to the comparisons suggested thus far. Work by Kliegl, Smith, and Baltes (1989) on testing the limits of cognitive function in young and older adults could be a useful paradigm for understanding cultural differences. To adopt this approach, one would train young and old adults from both cultures to some criterion on, say, a list-learning task, and then determine how much each group profited from the effect of additional experience and training on the task. Such an approach is used to measure plasticity of cognitive function and the manner in which cognitive reserve capacity is deployed. The present theorizing would suggest that the amount of plasticity observed in young adults could differ across cultures and would be related to task demands and how heavily the task loaded on cultural processing biases. For example, one might expect Chinese young to show more plasticity than young Americans on tasks that were dependent on holistic processes. Whether old Americans and Chinese would show equivalent or different amounts of plasticity on the task would be related to resource requirements of the task, according to the present theorizing.
BASIC MECHANISMS
Speed of processing, working memory, and inhibition are three basic cognitive mechanisms that appear to account for most if not all age-related variance in higher cognitive processes such as memory and reasoning (Park, 1998) . In this section, we argue that these basic processes may be susceptible to culture effects and that successful investigation of age, memory and culture requires a culture-invariant measure of these mechanisms. We discuss evidence that some measures of the basic mechanisms are culture-saturated but suggest that it is possible to isolate culture-invariant measures of the basic mechanisms.
Speed of Processing
A decrease in speed of processing has been suggested to be a general mechanism underlying age-related differences on virtually all cognitive tasks, including various forms of memory as well as other abilities such as reasoning, spatial cognition, and fluid intelligence (Birren, 1965; Mayr & Kliegl, 1993; Salthouse, 1996) . In our own laboratory, we have reported that speed of processing as measured by simple paper and pencil tasks accounted for all significant age-related variance in three types of memory tasks: spatial memory, cued recall, and free recall (Park et al., 1996) . An example of a speed of processing measure is a figural comparison task where subjects compare two relatively simple figures and make rapid decisions about whether one pattern is the same as or different from the other. The task measures the number of comparisons made in two minutes. Errors are rare. Hedden and colleagues (1999) reported that young and old Asians (residing in Beijing) and young and old Americans (residing in Ann Arbor) showed no cultural differences on a figural comparison task. That is, although age differences were observed, young Asians and Americans performed at the same level, and old Asians and Americans performed at the same level. In contrast, when these same subjects performed a digit comparison task (make same/different judgments about pairs of digit strings), the usual age difference was observed, as well as an interaction of age with culture. Young Asians were superior to young Americans on the digit comparison speed of processing task, but old Chinese and Americans performed equivalently, a pattern of cultural convergence similar to that reported for the fragment completion task described earlier. Geary and colleagues (1996) reported a somewhat different pattern of findings. They also found evidence for an Age X Culture interaction on a speed of processing task. They reported young Chinese to be superior to young Americans on a figure comparison task different from that used by Hedden and colleagues (1999) , but there was cultural equivalence for older adults. In general, the limited extant data lead to two important conclusions. First, it does seem feasible to isolate a culture-invariant measure of speed of processing, as both Hedden and colleagues and Geary and colleagues report some success at this. Second, when speed of processing tasks have shown evidence of culture-saturation in young adults, a pattern of cultural convergence has occurred for older adults, just as our hypothesis would predict for such an effortful, controlled task. Because there are many variants of speed of processing tasks that correlate highly with one another, it should be possible to isolate a culture-invariant measure of speed of processing. This remains an interesting and important challenge, as the isolation of such culture-invariant measures will provide an important metric for equating young adults and old adults from the two cultures in terms of cognitive resources, providing a base for interpreting subsequent memory differences between the two cultures. We also add the caveat that isolating such a measure would require replication across different socioeconomic levels within each culture and would show the same pattern in multiple countries within both the East Asian and Western cultures.
Working Memory Function
Craik and Byrd (1982) have proposed that older adults have limited "mental energy" and are deficient in self-initiated processing. They noted that older adults performed most poorly on tasks with high processing demands such as free recall, whereas less resource-demanding tasks like cued recall and recognition showed smaller age effects. This construct of mental energy or processing resource has frequently been operationalized as working memory (Baddeley, 1986) . Working memory can be viewed as the amount of cognitive resource available to simultaneously store new information and to perform mental operations on either incoming or recently accessed information. Older adults show significantly poorer working memory function (Park et al., 1996; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Stine & Wingfield, 1987) , and this estimate of cognitive resource is a sensitive measure of the resource requirements of long-term memory tasks. Park and colleagues (1996) used speed of processing and working memory as indicators of cognitive resources in a life-span sample of 320 adults. They demonstrated that (a) all age-related variance on memory tasks operated through these two constructs and (b) the strength of the relationship between working memory and long-term memory systematically increased across task difficulty, with spatial recall requiring the least processing resource, cued recall an intermediate amount, and free recall the most. Thus, Park and colleagues' (1996) data demonstrate convincingly that speed and working memory can be used as individual differences variables to estimate the amount of processing resources that different cognitive tasks require.
Data collected by Hedden and colleagues (1999) from a sample of college students and older adults in Beijing and in the United States indicated that the Corsi blocks task, which is an estimate of visuospatial working memory, may be a largely culture-free measure of resource. In the Corsi blocks task, participants remember the order in which an experimenter points to a series of blocks and repeat the pattern of the experimenter in the same order or in backward order. The backward task requires that the participant both hold the order of the blocks in memory (storage component) and manipulate the order mentally so that the blocks can be presented in backwards order (processing component). Hedden and colleagues found no evidence for a main effect of culture on either the forward or backward Corsi blocks task, nor evidence for an Age X Culture interaction. There was also no evidence for an interaction between culture and order of recall (forward vs backward), indicating that differing levels of processing complexity in the forward and backward versions did not differentially affect the two cultures. Young Asians and Americans performed equivalently (mean number of trials correct of 8.89 and 8.63, respectively). Old Asians and Americans performed more poorly than their younger counterparts, but the performance of old Asians and Americans was equivalent (mean number of trials correct of 7.82 and 7.35, respectively).
In contrast, Hedden et al. (1999) did find evidence for a Culture X Order interaction in the same participants on the digit span tasks, which are analogous to Corsi blocks, except that participants repeat digits forward or backward from the order read by the experimenter. Although the interaction of culture with age did not reach significance, Asians were superior to Americans on their forward memory for digits (13.63 versus 10.48 trials correct, respectively), whereas this difference was diminished in the backward digit task (9.00 versus 8.06 for Asians and Americans, respectively). This fits with the notion that as processing requirements increase, cultural effects will be diminished when automatically accessible knowledge structures are not available to support continued cognition. All participants performed both the Corsi blocks and digit span tasks. The digit span finding is reminiscent of the speed of processing finding for digit comparison and again suggests a facility for digits in Asians. Alternatively, it may be that with increased processing requirements, the ability to perform computations declines to the same level in the two cultures as available resources decrease, as is known to occur in aging. Perhaps most importantly, these data suggest that it is feasible to develop a culture-free measure of cognitive resource that can be used to understand the differing resource requirements of other memory tasks that are culture-saturated.
MEMORY
The lack of cross-cultural data on memory function even for young adults is astonishing, particularly given that the two cultures differ considerably in the relative emphasis that they place on rote memory as an important part of academic training. Liu P80 PARKETAL. (1974) and Bond (1991) both cite the importance of rote memorization in the Chinese educational system in contrast to an American system that emphasizes problem-solving and creativity. Liu suggests that Chinese will evidence memory performance superior to that of Americans. The data on this topic, however, are limited, as almost none of the data include direct cultural comparisons. Liu and Ma (1970) report better recall by Chinese in a Peterson and Peterson (1959) paradigm (a short-term memory paradigm with delayed recall), but rely on comparisons from their data set to the original Peterson and Peterson data. Similarly, Huang and Liu (1978) reported that Chinese subjects achieved 95% accuracy on a cued recall list within three trials, which is well above what is typically reported for an American sample on similar but not identical lists of words (Paivio, 1971) , but the failure to have a direct comparison group makes an inference of superior memory on the part of the Chinese premature. Levy and Langer (1994) present data suggesting that young Americans and Chinese are equivalent on memory measures. However, the tasks the participants performed were dot memorization and facial memory, and then a composite measure of memory was developed from these tasks, so it is difficult to evaluate the memory data Levy and Langer present. Finally, Cheung and Kemper (1993,1994) suggest that memory performance might be better for Chinese words due to a lower processing load imposed by Chinese syllables compared with English syllables. However, it is not clear if these effects would extend beyond measures of working memory and memory span.
Free Recall
There is little known about free recall differences between Chinese and Americans. Free recall is a highly strategic process, as it is generally believed that subjects apply subjective organizational strategies to lists of unrelated words (Tulving, 1962) . It is also well recognized that when words are presented in categories interspersed throughout the list, both young and old adults will engage in categorical clustering (Smith, 1979; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989) . That is, subjects will output the words in categorical groups, even though that is not the way they were presented to the subject initially. The work of Choi and colleagues (1997) demonstrates that Asians have difficulty using categories, a finding also reported by Liu (1974) .
We would expect that there would not be too much difference in the way cultures deal with a free recall list that does not have a categorical structure, although there might be a superiority for the young Asians due to the rote memorization training they receive. We expect substantial differences, however, when the lists have a category structure. Category structure is activated and used relatively automatically, so little mental effort should be required to use the categorical structure of a list to enhance memory on the part of elderly participants. In fact, Park, Cherry, Smith, & Lafronza (1990) demonstrate clearly that categorical clustering indices do not change with age, and that elderly individuals actually have slightly higher ratios than young persons.
The importance of having independent, culture-invariant measures of resource becomes apparent when considering how Asians and Westerners might use taxonomic category structure to facilitate memory. Because it appears that Asians find category structure more effortful to use, we would expect that young Asians with processing resources equivalent to those of young Americans (as measured by the culture-free measures of resource) would remember fewer words than Americans in a categorized list. However, memory would be equivalent for uncategorized lists. The cultural differences may become more pronounced with age, with Asians evidencing steeper decline compared with Americans, due to the environmental support afforded to the Americans by the categorical structure. We would not necessarily hypothesize that resources would account for more variance on the task for Asians than for Americans (though this is a distinct possibility), but rather that Americans will remember more with an equivalent pool of resources. It is also possible, of course, that Asians might have a culturally biased alternative strategy that would be as effective as categorical clustering and would not evidence a decrease relative to Americans. Nevertheless, such a bias would reveal itself, even if raw memory scores were the same cross-culturally, when measures of strategic differences in categorical clustering were examined. It is also important to note that the category structure of Chinese categories is largely unknown. It is possible that when lists were structured according to Chinese category norms, categorical clustering would occur more in Chinese than in Americans. There is an urgent need to develop normative data using procedures similar to those of Battig and Montague (1969) to map the structure of categories for Chinese so that knowledge and processs differences in the use of categories between the two cultures can occur.
Cued Recall
Cued recall is intermediate between free recall and recognition in effort and cognitive resources required, as the structural equation models of Park and colleagues (1996) clearly demonstrate. The cued recall task becomes interesting in the study of cultural differences because the existing data suggest Chinese are more attuned to contextual relationships and have a bias for holistic processing. A study conducted by Park and colleagues (1990) showed that when subjects studied unrelated pictures (e.g., an ant and a cherry), there were large age differences on this cued recall task when "ant" served as the retrieval cue. When two conceptually related items were presented (e.g., an ant and a spider), the old participants nearly tripled their recall from the unrelated condition, improving much more than young adults; apparently the old adults were able to use automatically activated categorical information to support recall in a very effective manner. When the pictures were physically interacting (e.g., the ant attacks the cherry), the facilitation effects were much smaller than under the conditions of the conceptual relationship. The study provides a basis to examine aging, cued recall, and cultural differences, as it suggests a very interesting set of predictions. We would expect that young Chinese, who are very attuned to the physical context and environment, would profit more than young Americans from the physically interacting stimuli (ant attacks cherry), but that young Chinese would not show much facilitation from the categorically related cues (ant/spider) due to a cultural bias against the use of categories. Because the facilitation is based on world knowledge and automatic activations, we would expect culture to magnify the effects of the cues across the life span, so that old Chinese would show the most facilitation for the physically interacting figures and old Americans the most facilitation for the conceptually related figures.
Recognition
On the surface, recognition memory would not seem to be interesting, as it is perhaps the least effortful of all types of explicit memory and large age differences are not always found, although we have reported age differences in recognition memory (Park, Puglisi, & Smith, 1986; Park & Puglisi, 1985) . Typically, American subjects are more likely to falsely recognize categorically related distractors when presented during recognition compared to distractors unrelated to the targets. We would expect, however, that due to the more limited use of categorical information, neither young nor old Asians would have the same degree of difficulty discriminating categorically related distractors as Westerners. Work on recognition memory may thus provide additional insight into the dimensions along which the cultures differ in their encoding and organization of information in memory.
Memory and Context
Because of the bias that Chinese have to process information holistically, we hypothesize that they are more sensitive to contextual information than young adults. Context is, in a sense, information that covaries with target information, and the work of Nisbett and colleagues (1999) shows that young Chinese are better at detecting covarying events than Americans. We expect that this bias extends to the domain of memory. Due to the holistic nature of the processing of Chinese, we expect that Chinese will perform "binding" operations between target and context (Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996) more efficiently than Americans. That is, they will be superior at remembering context associated with a to-be-remembered target. Chalfonte & Johnson (1996) demonstrated that old adults have difficulty binding context to target. They speculate that this binding deficit in elderly adults is the basis for poor source memory (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Mclntyre & Craik, 1987; Schacter, Kaszniak, Kihlstrom, & Valdisseri, 1991) and for poor context memory (Light & Zelinski, 1983; Park, Puglisi, & Sovacool, 1983; Zelinski & Light, 1988) . Chinese elderly adults should maintain sensitivity to contextual information due to the automatically activated tendency to process such information.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
There are numerous methodological issues associated with the study of aging, culture, and cognition. As we have noted in proceeding sections, it is critical when studying cognition that culture-invariant measures of cognitive resource be used as one index for equating young adults across cultures and old adults across cultures. In addition, there are a number of additional concerns that cognitive aging researchers should be prepared to address when conducting cross-cultural research. The two domains of primary concern involve sampling issues and design of stimulus materials.
Sampling
In addition to equating subjects from the two cultures on culture-invariant measures of speed of processing and working memory (which still remain to be isolated definitively), we advocate using two subscales from the WAIS-R and the WAIS-RC (Revised in China) to sample subjects within a certain percentile range of ability. For example, one might select young and old subjects who scored between the 70th and 95th percentiles for their age group on the two subscales within each culture. This would have the effect of sampling subjects from the same strata of ability within the culture, regardless of age. It would also result in subjects between cultures occupying the same location on the ability distributions within their culture, although of course the relative distribution of abilities are not necessarily the same between cultures. Because there are not large differences between the raw scale scores for young and old adults on the Comprehension Test and the Information Tests for either the American or Chinese norms on the WAIS, we believe that these two subscales are ideal for characterizing crosscultural cognitive aging samples. We do not recommend the use of the vocabulary subscale because the raw scale scores for the Chinese old and young differ dramatically (with Chinese old scoring much lower than young).
We are not in favor of equating subjects within or across cultures for education in a precise manner, as access to education differs considerably as both a function of age and culture. We utilize cutoff scores for education or ranges of education, rather than precise matching, and have found this technique very successful in equating subjects on the more important measures of cognitive resource and the WAIS subscales. We recognize that the techniques advocated here will result in good matching of ability across age groups within a culture, but that it cannot, of course, be certain, that the groups have been matched across cultures. Rather than attempt to address this issue solely within a psychometric framework, we argue for a second sampling technique. We suggest that a second procedure that can be used is to study young and old adults in each culture from two ability levels or socioeconomic strata-one relatively more elite and one relatively less elite. Although we would not expect aging and cultural differences to interact with ability levels, we recognize that data on the issues of aging, culture, and cognition are presently so limited that it is important for initial work to be sufficiently reliable as to constitute a gold standard for future investigations. The inclusion of two levels of ability helps assess cohort effects.
In general, we advocate adopting the same approach used by Baltes and colleagues in the Berlin aging study. Baltes and Smith (1997) acknowledge sampling concerns in their study of individuals up to age 105, recognizing that the oldest adults represent increasingly elite individuals relative to younger adults. They suggest that the interpretation of their data must address this limitation in their work, and they do so openly, but they have nevertheless made critically important contributions to a domain where there was relatively little scientific knowledge. Similarly, we acknowledge that the cross-sectional nature of the age manipulation is not a perfect methodology for the assessment of cultural differences. However, like Baltes and Smith, researchers must make every effort to sample carefully within the cultures and equate subjects in important ways, while recognizing that the cross-sectional nature of the design does not definitively permit us to rule out cohort effects. The inclusion of samples from two socioeduational strata allows investigators to determine the generality of findings and provides direction for resolving any cohort issues, should there not be generality across samples.
We should also note that Chinese versions of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975 ) are available to screen for dementia. The MMSE was val-P82 PARKETAL.
idated in sample of both low ability Chinese (Katzman et al., 1988) and high ability Chinese (Salmon et al., 1989) . Also available is a second dementia screening device, the Fuld Object Memory Test, which has been used successfully in cross-cultural studies that included Asian subjects (Chiu et. al., 1997) .
Finally, we should note that we take the position that it is desirable to avoid confounds caused by subjects having joint exposure to both cultures under study. For this reason, we advocate studying the subjects in the geographic setting of interest (e.g., Asian subjects in Asia and American subjects in the United States). There is evidence that when Asian American samples are studied, the participants perform more like Westerners than participants who have resided exclusively in Asia (Choi et al., 1997) . We also recognize that Asian cultures are becoming increasingly Westernized, and it would be useful, as well, to consider comparing samples of Asian subjects from somewhat more Westernized locales (e.g., Hong Kong) to those in markedly less Westernized settings (smaller cities in China).
Stimulus Materials
There are many issues that one must be sensitive to in designing stimulus materials for use in cognitive tasks in Eastern and Western cultures.
Numerically based stimuli.-One possible solution to develop culturally universal stimuli is to present memory stimuli in the form of digits, as Asians and Westerners use Arabic numerals for all representations of number. Besides the obvious problem that the use of digits limits the types of stimuli that can be designed and presented, there are additional problems with presenting stimuli as numbers. First, the Chinese, particularly the young adults, have more experience and training with mathematics and numbers than young Americans, so the Chinese may be more facile with the numbers due to experience, rather than due to some fundamental differences in culturally based thought processes Stevenson & Stigler, 1992) . Additionally, Chinese syllabic structure for individuals numbers (e.g., "one, two, three") is less dense than in English, and the numerals can be articulated much more rapidly in Chinese than in English (Cheung & Kemper, 1993 . Evidence that Chinese have superior short-term memory spans and working memory capacity must be viewed with caution when the estimates are based on recall for numbers (Hedden et al, 1999) .
Abstract visual stimuli.-Abstract visual stimuli that are meaningful to neither culture would seem to be an ideal solution to the problems of cross-culturally appropriate stimulus materials, as neither culture would seem to have an edge for these materials. However, abstract designs may be more similar to Chinese characters used in writing, even though these same designs might appear abstract to Westerners. As a result, Chinese might be superior at remembering abstract patterns due to their similarity to Chinese characters. In general, abstract figures have the potential to be a useful source for stimuli, but care must be taken to make them equally unfamiliar to both cultures. We have designed materials, for example, that rely on configurations of dots and bear little resemblance to Chinese characters or to English letters to circumvent some of these issues. Whether Chinese or Americans would have an advantage for a particular set of abstract visual stimuli would, of course, depend on whether a holistic or a feature-based strategy were optimal for acquiring the stimuli. The theorizing presented here would suggest that Chinese would have the stimuli bound into a holistic representation whereas Americans might encode such stimuli as a set of features.
Meaningful pictures.-Pictures of everyday objects or of complex real-world scenes are a potential source of stimuli for memory research cross-culturally. However, it is striking how few objects appear to be equally familiar to both cultures. Clothing tends to be culturally specific; modes of transportation vary widely across the two cultures; most types of animals are more familiar to Americans than to Chinese; and even simple vegetables and fruits vary widely in their familiarity between the two cultures. An important task will be to map naming latency of what appear to be prototypical pictures for the two cultures in an effort to develop a set of stimuli that could be used cross-culturally. A good starting point would be to norm crossculturally naming latencies for the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) standardized pictures. Complex scenes have similar problems, although scenes from magazines such as National Geographic have much to recommend them as appropriate for use in both cultures. An alternative strategy would be to norm for familiarity culturally specific pictures that had roughly similar content. The presentation of different stimuli of equal familiarity to the two cultures could be an important methodological innovation for studying acquisition of meaningful pictures across the two cultures.
Verbal materials.-There are times when only the presentation of verbal materials will permit the assessment of important hypotheses. Besides obvious differences in articulation rate, associative norms for stimuli will differ markedly between cultures. Additionally, there is evidence that the time required to access meaning from a Chinese character is somewhat longer than that for an English word (Biederman & Tsao, 1979) . The methodological issues associated with presentation of verbal stimuli are daunting and are explored extensively by Chan (1976) and Bond (1991) .
Response modes.-In general, reaction times and recognition tasks are the preferred mode of responding. It is preferable that the subject not have to translate a nonverbal stimulus into a verbal representation for response, as that adds an additional potential source of confounding across cultures. We also recommend the use of touch screens for a response mode, as the touch screens are a highly intuitive interface ideally suited to cross-cultural research, particularly with older adults, who may have difficulty with writing due to arthritis and other motor difficulties.
Effect sizes.-One final point of considerable importance is that the calculation of effect sizes would prove to be particularly useful in cross-cultural aging work. Interpreting results in the context of effect sizes would permit an assessment of not only the magnitude of culture effects across the life span, but also the relative contributions of aging and culture to cognitive behaviors. Moreover, the use of effect sizes would provide preliminary information about how pervasive the effects of culture and aging on cognitive function might be outside the laboratory.
As the present review has made apparent, there is much important work that needs to be done to understand how cognitive aging occurs in a cultural context. We argue that culture differences observed in young adults will be more pronounced in older adults if the basis of the observed difference is use of world knowledge. When culture differences in cognitive function observed in young adults are based on fundamental differences in cognitive mechanics, that is, effortful, controlled cognitive processes, age may act to minimize culture differences. Neurobiological decline is a cultural universal and may act to "level" and limit deployment of culture-based strategies, resulting in increasing similarity of processing across cultures as individuals age. To investigate these hypotheses, it is critical that culture-invariant measures of basic cognitive resources be isolated. This permits individuals sampled from different cultures to be matched on basic cognitive resources, thus permitting an interpretation of culture-based processing biases that emerge on other, culture-saturated tasks.
